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Abstract
This article analyzes theories of institutional trust in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, two developing 
countries that have shared some historical legacies but currently manifest divergent economic and political 
trajectories. The evidence confirms that conventional theories emphasizing participation and government 
performance help us understand institutional trust in both countries. In addition, the analysis emphasizes 
the analytical leverage gained by exploring the extent to which different facets of engagement have divergent 
effects on institutional trust. The findings build upon previous research to underscore the importance 
of considering how context shapes the precise ways in which performance and engagement influence 
institutional trust, particularly when analyzing the developing world.
Keywords
Institutional trust, government performance, political participation, civic engagement, religious engagement, 
contextual effects, corruption, security, economy
Corresponding author:
Jana Morgan, University of Tennessee, 1001 McClung Tower Knoxville, TN 37996-0410, USA. 
Email: jana.k.morgan@gmail.com
534703 IPS0010.1177/0192512114534703International Political Science ReviewStoyan et al.
research-article2014
Article
 by guest on June 19, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
2 International Political Science Review 
Introduction
Trust in government institutions is frequently considered an important indicator of diffuse political 
support (Easton, 1965; Newton and Norris, 2000). Moreover, institutional trust has significant con-
sequences for citizens’ commitment to democratic norms and the survival of democratic regimes 
(Mishler and Rose, 2005). Existing scholarship analyzing the origins of trust in institutions tends to 
emphasize two main streams of theorizing: explanations involving performance of government 
institutions (Espinal et al., 2006; Hetherington, 1998; Mishler and Rose, 2001) and those emphasiz-
ing citizens’ political or civic engagement (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002).1 Often, these theories 
focus on facets of performance and participation that are especially relevant in advanced democra-
cies. However, the most important aspects of performance and engagement may differ in the devel-
oping world where economic insecurity, political instability and state weakness are commonplace.
Here we unpack the general arguments advanced by established theories by considering multiple 
facets of each concept. We also build upon previous research to consider context-contingent effects, 
particularly how economic and political fragility shape the effects exerted by performance and par-
ticipation. We assess the applicability of conventional theories of institutional trust in the developing 
world and identify new expressions of these theories. In so doing, we explore the extent to which 
alternative facets provide insights into the formation of trust outside established democracies.
To examine how facets of performance and participation might have divergent ramifications in 
different countries, we analyze trust in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, two states that share an 
island in the Caribbean and common histories of poverty and authoritarianism, yet manifest sharply 
divergent contemporary trajectories. In the early 1960s, the two countries had similarly low per capita 
gross domestic products (GDPs) and shared records of political instability punctuated by foreign 
intervention and patrimonial authoritarian rule. However, since that time the Dominican Republic has 
had one of the region’s best records of growth together with increasingly stable democracy. Haiti, in 
turn, has experienced dramatic economic decline and governments characterized by authoritarian 
patrimonialism, limited democracy and, above all, instability. As a result of these differences, we 
expect to observe significant variation in Dominican and Haitian trust in government, as well as vari-
ation in the ways performance and participation shape trust. These expectations are borne out in the 
analysis below. Despite their shared historical commonalities and subsequent divergence, which offer 
excellent analytical leverage for comparison, there has been surprisingly little analysis contrasting 
these neighboring countries.2 This article capitalizes on this analytical opportunity.
We begin by reviewing the socioeconomic and political evolution of the Dominican Republic 
and Haiti, focusing on their divergent trajectories and the implications these differences may have 
for institutional trust. Then, we detail two major theories concerning the formation of institutional 
trust, hypothesizing about the effects of government performance and engagement. We contextual-
ize our hypotheses based upon each country’s distinct economic and political conditions. Next, we 
outline the 2008, 2010 and 2012 AmericasBarometer survey data that we use to analyze our 
hypotheses concerning institutional trust. These survey years are particularly important because 
they enable analysis of attitudes before and after Haiti’s January 2010 earthquake, which devas-
tated the population, infrastructure and public sector.3 Then we discuss our results, comparing and 
contrasting the two countries. We conclude with a discussion of our findings’ theoretical and 
empirical implications.
Common histories, divergent trajectories
Troubled relations between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and the differences in their recent 
socioeconomic and political evolution have deep historical roots. When former slaves proclaimed 
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Haitian independence in 1804, Santo Domingo on the eastern side of the island found itself under 
occupation by French, British and Haitian forces, although the Spanish reclaimed control in 1809. 
Haiti fended off foreign invasion and in the 1820s began a 22-year occupation of the Dominican 
Republic. Dominicans recall the occupation as a period of brutal military rule, even as it defini-
tively ended slavery and reinforced Dominicans’ self-perceptions as different from Haitians 
(Moya Pons, 1985).
Both countries experienced violent, unstable politics and extensive international intervention, 
particularly from the United States. Indeed, the US military occupied both states for extensive 
periods in the early 20th century, with US policy being more controlling in Haiti, largely due to 
racism (Knight, 1990). The Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic (1930–1961) forcibly 
demarcated the national border with a brutal massacre of Haitians in 1937. Building on Dominican 
antipathy toward Haiti, Trujillo cultivated a nationalist ideology appealing to Hispanic and Catholic 
values. Trujillo represented an extreme form of neopatrimonialism, with extraordinary personal 
power inhibiting institutional development (Hartlyn, 1998). In Haiti, US occupation also fostered 
conditions for a neopatrimonial ruler, leading to the ascendance of François Duvalier in 1957. 
Duvalier presented himself as a defender of black interests against the mulatto elite and success-
fully confronted potential resistance by strengthening support within the black middle class and 
parts of the peasantry and by building his security force, the Tontons Macoutes (Nicholls, 1998).
However, the trajectories of the two countries diverged dramatically mid-century. While the 
Dominican Republic and Haiti had similar per capita incomes just below US$800 in 1960, by 2005 
they were very different; the Dominican Republic had roughly tripled its GDP per capita to around 
US$2500, whereas Haiti’s had fallen to US$430 (Jaramillo and Sancak, 2009: 324; constant 2000 
US$). Over this period, the Dominican Republic achieved one of the highest growth records in the 
region; Haiti experienced the lowest. On social indicators, despite Dominican failure to match 
economic success with similar social advances, Haiti lagged behind (UNDP, 2011).
Political patterns also diverged during this period, even as extensive US involvement persisted 
in both countries. Beginning with Trujillo’s assassination in 1961, the Dominican Republic began 
an uneven process of democratization, partly influenced by US Cold War concerns. It was marked 
by a brief civil war and US occupation in 1965, followed by 12 years of civilian authoritarianism 
under Joaquín Balaguer. Then, a democratic transition in 1978 allowed the emergence of a com-
petitive party system, initially built around the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) and 
Balaguer’s Reformist Social Christian Party (PRSC), which steadily declined after his death in 
2002 (Morgan et al., 2011). The democratic regime survived a post-electoral crisis in 1994, and by 
the late 1990s basic procedural elements of democracy were well-established. The Dominican 
Liberation Party (PLD) emerged as significant in the 1980s as it began shifting from the left to the 
center-right. The PLD has increasingly dominated electoral politics, particularly since the 2003 
economic downturn and financial scandal that temporarily weakened institutional trust and ena-
bled Leonel Fernández (PLD) to defeat incumbent Hipólito Mejía (PRD) in the 2004 presidential 
elections (Morgan and Espinal, 2006; Sagás, 2005). Fernández won reelection in 2008, and his 
co-partisan Danilo Medina was elected president in 2012 (Meilán, 2013).4 Despite relative stabil-
ity, the Dominican Republic remains marked by inequality and poverty as well as patrimonialism, 
clientelism and corruption (Morgan et al., 2011).
Haiti, however, was dominated by brutal, authoritarian rule for several more decades. Whereas 
the United States intervened following Trujillo’s 1961 assassination to limit his family’s power, the 
death of Haiti’s ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier in 1971 was followed by regime continuity, as his son Jean-
Claude ‘Baby Doc’ Duvalier (1971–1986) inherited control with US acquiescence. However, Baby 
Doc’s base eroded as power gradually shifted from the black middle class and prosperous peasants 
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toward mulatto technocrats and businessmen, provoking popular protest, international isolation 
and his exile in 1986 (Fatton, 2002).
Since 1986, Haiti has been marked by considerable social and political instability and interna-
tional intervention. A massacre of voters by security forces suspended the 1987 elections. Fraud 
and low turnout have also tainted election outcomes, and political parties have been weak (Dupuy, 
1997; Gros, 1997). President Jean-Bertrand Aristide overwhelmingly won elections in 1990, but 
was ousted by a military intervention after only nine months in office; he was then removed again 
in 2004 after his return to power in 2000 (Dupuy, 2007). This led to the arrival of what became a 
long-term United Nations stabilization force in a context of criminal and political violence, state 
disarray and widespread impunity (Heine and Thompson, 2011; Mendelson Forman, 2012). 
Problematic elections in February 2006 produced the reelection of René Préval, who served previ-
ously in 1996–2001. Because of the January 2010 earthquake, national elections scheduled for that 
February were postponed until November. Following opposition charges of fraud, the government 
upheld an Organization of American States (OAS) recommendation concerning the run-off elec-
tion and replaced the government candidate, who had come in second by a narrow margin, with 
Michel Martelly, a popular musician and businessman (Taft-Morales, 2011). Martelly won the 
March 2011 run-off and faced hostile opposition in a fragmented legislature through the 2012 sur-
vey analyzed here.5 Overall, state weakness, international interference and instability still charac-
terize Haitian politics (ICG, 2013).
In sum, while Haiti and the Dominican Republic share some commonalities in economic and 
political development, over recent decades Dominicans have generally enjoyed greater economic 
prosperity, political stability and democracy. Thus, we would expect Dominicans to have more 
confidence in democratic institutions than Haitians. Public opinion data from the 2008, 2010 and 
2012 AmericasBarometers confirms this, although Dominicans have experienced declines in trust 
over this period. Haitian trust dipped after the 2010 earthquake but recovered in 2012. On a scale 
of trust in key government institutions that ranges from zero to 24,6 Dominicans average around 
the midpoint with scores of 13.30 in 2008, 12.42 in 2010 and 11.29 in 2012, while Haitians are 
significantly more disenchanted, scoring 9.15 in 2008, 8.49 in 2010 and 9.01 in 2012. When com-
pared to the rest of Latin America and the Caribbean,7 Dominicans scored among the best in the 
region in 2008, but moved toward the regional average in 2010 and 2012. Haitians took last place 
in the region following the 2010 earthquake and ranked near the bottom in 2008 and 2012. Beyond 
demonstrating that the divergent trajectories outlined above are associated with different levels of 
institutional trust, we are interested in exploring how these contrasting experiences might shape the 
causal processes that influence formation of attitudes toward regime institutions. We now turn to a 
discussion of general theories of institutional trust and explore their predictions in light of differ-
ences in the Dominican and Haitian contexts.
Theoretical foundations
Research examining public trust in political institutions typically considers two major types of 
explanations. The first emphasizes the influence of perceptions of government’s economic and 
political performance (Lipset and Schneider, 1987; Mishler and Rose, 2001). The second addresses 
how citizens’ engagement and participation influence institutional trust, with some scholars iden-
tifying a positive relationship between engagement and trust (Putnam, 1993) and others pointing to 
a negative one (Brehm and Rahn, 1997). Here we explore how these accounts might explain trust 
in government among Dominicans and Haitians.
We consider facets of performance and engagement that are typically theorized; then we also 
identify facets of these theories that have received less attention in existing scholarship but may 
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prove illuminating in contexts like the Dominican Republic and Haiti. In particular, we explore 
how trust might be shaped by concerns such as insecurity, corruption and clientelism, which are 
prevalent issues in countries with nascent or flawed democratic institutions. Moreover, we draw on 
previous research on institutional trust to consider how the divergent trajectories and contemporary 
circumstances in Haiti and the Dominican Republic might shape causal patterns within each coun-
try. Finally, we discuss how ideology, democratic values and socio-demographic characteristics 
might influence institutional trust.
Government performance
Considerable research has demonstrated that citizens assess governments based on perceptions of 
their own economic status and that of the national economy (Kelly, 2003; MacKuen et al., 1992). 
As governments deliver economically, citizens are much more likely to trust the institutions seen 
to be providing well-being. The influence of economic evaluations on institutional trust may be 
particularly relevant in countries with shorter democratic legacies, as attitudes about regime insti-
tutions are less deeply rooted and more susceptible to recent performance (Espinal et al., 2006; 
Mishler and Rose, 2001). Therefore, we expect economic evaluations to be positively associated 
with trust in the Dominican Republic and Haiti.
In addition to economic issues, citizens likely expect government to address other concerns, 
such as delivering public services, guaranteeing security and combating corruption. These matters 
may be particularly pressing in fragile democracies where shortcomings in these arenas have the 
potential to undermine governance and the economy in addition to disrupting everyday life. Basic 
services, public safety and respect for the rule of law cannot be taken for granted in such contexts, 
making their provision particularly salient. Previous research analyzing less-established democra-
cies suggests that performance in non-economic policy domains has the potential to shape trust in 
significant ways (Askvik et al., 2011; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Morris and Klesner, 2010; Seligson, 
2002; Wong et al., 2011). In light of these findings combined with persistent threats to rule of law 
and state capacity in both the Dominican Republic and Haiti, we anticipate that government’s 
political performance likely plays an important role in shaping institutional trust (see also Espinal 
et al., 2006; Heine and Thompson, 2011). Moreover, given the severity of ongoing policy chal-
lenges outside the economic realm, evaluations of government ability to provide services, promote 
security and confront corruption may weigh even more heavily than economic assessments in the 
formation of both Dominican and Haitian views regarding regime institutions.
Engagement and participation
We also explore how civic and political participation shape institutional trust, a relationship that 
has been much-debated in previous research. Putnam has made the strongest case that civic engage-
ment fosters confidence in government by creating positive social capital (Putnam, 1993), but 
evidence for this has been mixed (e.g. Newton and Norris, 2000). Others have argued that activism 
has the potential to expose a disjuncture between democratic ideals and reality, promoting critical 
views of regime institutions (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Finkel et al., 2000). In addition, several stud-
ies have emphasized the importance of specific institutional and cultural contexts in shaping how 
participation affects trust (Askvik et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2011). In an effort to reconcile these 
expectations, we draw on our understanding of the Haitian and Dominican experiences to con-
sider how diverse kinds of participation might have conflicting effects on trust and how different 
contexts might produce distinct causal patterns. In particular, we consider positive types of par-
ticipation, including civic engagement, religious engagement and political interest, as well as more 
particularistic and partisan forms of participation.
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Positive participation. As noted above, although conventional wisdom tends to view civic engage-
ment as promoting institutional trust, there may be contexts where this expectation does not hold. 
While positive civic participation sometimes generates social capital, this pattern is not the inherent 
outgrowth of engagement, but rather hinges upon the nature of associational life in a particular con-
text. For instance, Dominican civic associations have been extensively politicized as a result of 
penetration and control by political parties, and associational activism often has clientelist goals 
(Espinal et al., 2010). In this context, the capacity for citizen engagement to foster genuine social 
capital, as opposed to creating opportunities for political advancement or personal enrichment 
through clientelism, may be highly constrained (Choup, 2003, 2006). Thus, participation is less 
likely to foster institutional trust, as social capital and interpersonal trust, which are the primary 
mechanisms for translating engagement into pro-regime attitudes, are unlikely outcomes of civic 
participation in the Dominican Republic. Building on previous scholarship, then, we expect the 
positive potential for civic engagement to be tempered in the Dominican context (Espinal et al., 
2006; Finkel et al., 2000).
In Haiti, on the other hand, associational life is more independent from the country’s weak par-
ties and state (Fatton, 2011). Civic engagement is local, occurring at the grassroots level and focus-
ing on communities jointly confronting social ills such as poverty, housing shortages and 
malnutrition.8 This form of engagement is more likely to generate social capital and interpersonal 
trust, which Putnam (1993) argued to be instrumental in fostering trust in government. Thus, 
despite the fact that both countries have comparatively high levels of civic engagement for the 
region,9 the grassroots nature of civic engagement in Haiti is more likely to be positively associated 
with institutional trust than the partisan and clientelist kinds of participation common in the 
Dominican Republic.
We also explore the impact of participation in religious organizations, beyond attending ser-
vices. Here we hypothesize patterns nearly opposite those for civic engagement, with more ambig-
uous expectations for Haiti and clearer ones for the Dominican Republic. In the Dominican 
Republic, although Protestantism has made inroads and the share of people without religious affili-
ation has increased, the Catholic Church continues to dominate religious life (Betances, 2007). 
With around 70% of religious Dominicans identifying as Catholic in all three AmericasBarometer 
surveys analyzed here, most religious engagement is still likely to occur in Catholic associations. 
Moreover, with limited exceptions, the Catholic Church in the Dominican Republic has maintained 
a posture of supporting and legitimating the state, and most Protestant denominations do not devi-
ate from this stance (Betances, 2007). In this environment, attending religious meetings may foster 
trust in state institutions. The Haitian religious landscape is more complex. In the three surveys 
analyzed here, approximately 55% of religious Haitians identify as Catholic, one-third practice 
some form of Protestantism and 4% affiliate with traditional religions such as Vodou. However, 
syncretism between Catholicism and Vodou in the Haitian context as well as ongoing persecution 
of Vodou practitioners likely produces underestimates of the prevalence of Vodou (Hurbon, 2001). 
Moreover, Haitian Protestants typically advocate views critical of the state, and the stance of the 
Catholic Church vis-à-vis the state has been ambivalent (Hurbon, 2001; Louis, 2011). In this envi-
ronment of greater religious diversity and less state–church collaboration, Haitian participation in 
religious organizations may be less likely to promote institutional trust.
Political interest is also a potentially positive form of engagement as it encourages a politically 
informed and active citizenry. We expect to observe a positive relationship between political inter-
est and institutional trust in the Dominican Republic, where democracy is more stable and legiti-
mate and government can point to tangible successes. In Haiti, where democracy is fragile and 
governments have failed to deliver, attention to politics has the potential to be associated with 
negative views of the state, undermining institutional trust.
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Particularistic participation. Participation in which voters seek particularistic benefits is distinct from 
the types of engagement discussed above. Particularistic engagement involves citizens participating 
not to seek the public good, but to obtain resources for themselves, their family or a small set of 
individuals. These patterns of participation are unlikely to promote broad social ties or activate col-
lective consciousness, as they are aimed toward self-advancement, not seeking the common good. 
Instead of fostering social capital and institutional trust as we might expect from grassroots engage-
ment, exchange-oriented participation, which is frequently clientelist in nature, is likely to promote 
individualism and encourage resource-contingent assessments of regime institutions (Kitschelt and 
Wilkinson, 2007). Moreover, state ties built around particularistic exchanges have the potential to 
provoke disenchantment concerning the lack of impartiality in state institutions and the significance 
of personal connections for obtaining access. Given these features, exchange-based ties are unlikely 
to promote institutional trust and may weaken confidence in state institutions.
Partisan participation. The final form of participation that we consider is partisan in nature. Partisan 
ties are likely to promote institutional trust within the group that controls the state apparatus, but 
may undermine trust among those out of power. In this sense, the effect of partisan participation on 
institutional trust is contingent upon which party has the most influence in government. Building 
on Anderson et al. (2005), who show that electoral losers accord less legitimacy to political institu-
tions, particularly those in developing countries with less-established democracies like those ana-
lyzed here, we expect less trust among opposition supporters and independents and more trust 
among those affiliated with the governing party.
Ideology and democratic values
In addition, we consider how ideology and support for democratic norms might be associated with 
institutional trust. We expect legacies of authoritarianism to play a role in shaping the effects of these 
variables. In both countries, the authoritarian state apparatus primarily repressed the left while receiv-
ing support from conservative forces (Dupuy, 1997; Espinal, 1987). Given this experience, we expect 
respondents who identify with the right to be more deferential toward state authority and express 
greater institutional trust, while those on the left will be more skeptical of the state and less trusting.
With regard to the effect of democratic values, conflicting evidence in the literature leads to 
unclear expectations. Cultural theories hold that authoritarian polities foster distrust, which would 
lead us to expect a positive relationship between democratic values and trust (cf. Mishler and Rose, 
2001). However, scholarship in advanced democracies suggests that those most committed to 
democracy may be especially distrusting of imperfect real-world institutions (Dalton, 2000; 
Inglehart, 1999).
Analysis of institutional trust
We employ data from the 2008, 2010 and 2012 AmericasBarometer surveys conducted by the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP). All six surveys used national probability sam-
ples of voting-age adults interviewed face-to-face in Creole (Haiti) or Spanish (Dominican 
Republic).10
Measurement
We measure institutional trust using an additive scale of four survey items asking respondents 
about their confidence in the national legislature, Supreme Court, national election commission 
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and the courts.11 Cronbach’s alpha scores range from 0.65 to 0.79, values that indicate a reliable 
scale.12 As discussed above, Haitians consistently displayed significantly lower trust than 
Dominicans.
To assess how various facets of government performance influence trust, we employ four ques-
tions gauging assessments of the national economic situation, public service delivery, security 
provision and efforts to combat corruption. In 2008 and 2010, Dominicans evaluated performance 
more positively than Haitians across all four categories; in 2012 service evaluations were the only 
category where Haitians rated their government worse than Dominicans. We expect positive per-
formance evaluations to be associated with greater trust.
The analysis also includes measures of the three types of participation outlined above: positive, 
particularistic and partisan. Positive participation includes civic engagement, religious engage-
ment and political interest. We measure civic engagement using frequency of attendance at com-
munity organization meetings: higher values indicate more participation.13 Haitians and Dominicans 
manifested similar levels of participation in associational life until 2012, when Haitian participa-
tion outpaced Dominicans’ after the earthquake when many Haitians mobilized to resolve com-
munity problems (Bell, 2010). Religious engagement is measured as frequency of participation in 
religious organization meetings. In both countries, religious participation is higher than any type of 
civic engagement. To capture attentiveness to politics, we use self-reported political interest.14
We tap the concept of particularistic participation through a factor score based on three ques-
tions asking respondents if they have ever sought help in resolving their problems by contacting a 
member of the national legislature, a local political leader or a representative of the public bureau-
cracy.15 Contacting public officials for personal assistance in this way reflects particularistic pat-
terns of engagement with the state in which individuals seek to extract government benefits for 
themselves, their family or friends. As detailed above, we do not expect this particularistic brand 
of participation to promote institutional trust.
The final facet of participation is partisan in nature. We use partisan identification to code 
respondents into three categories: those who affiliate with the president’s party (Incumbent), those 
who affiliate with another party (Opposition) and independents.16 In the analysis, we include indi-
cator variables for Opposition and Independent; Incumbent is the reference category.
We also consider how ideology and democratic values shape trust. Our measure of ideology is 
the classic left–right scale where respondents place themselves between 1 (left) and 10 (right). To 
capture democratic values, we create a scale based on eight survey items measuring tolerance for 
political activism and for the civil rights of government opponents as well as gays and lesbians. 
Higher values indicate stronger commitment to democratic values.
Finally, we control socioeconomic status (SES), education, place of residence, sex and age. 
Details of these measures can be found in the supplemental material.
Results
Table 1 displays the results of regression analysis assessing the relationships between institutional 
trust and independent variables measuring government performance, participation, ideology, dem-
ocratic values and demographic factors.17 We conduct separate analyses for Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic in 2008, 2010 and 2012.18 The overall model fit for all six of these analyses is good; 
R-squared values align with conventional levels in the public opinion literature.
Upon examining Table 1, it is apparent that government performance in a variety of arenas 
influences institutional trust. In both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, we observe some signifi-
cant effects for all four performance evaluation measures on institutional trust, although the find-
ings in the 2012 data are not as strong as the preceding years. The findings are largely consistent 
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Figure 1. Magnitude of significant effects on institutional trust, Dominican Republic.
 by guest on June 19, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Stoyan et al. 11
0.28
-0.43
-0.36
0.27
0.51
-0.43
0.37
1.06
0.45
0.67
0.44
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
Rural
Educaon
SES
Right Ideology
Democrac Values
Polical Interest
Civic Engagement
Combat Corrupon
Security Evaluaons
Service Evaluaons
Economic Evaluaons
Effect on Instuonal Trust of 1 S.D. Shi in Explanatory Variable
Panel A. 2008
0.13
0.58
-0.25
0.31
-1.18
0.23
1.14
0.75
1.11
0.17
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
Age
Rural
Educaon
Ideology
Independent
Polical Interest
Combat Corrupon
Security Evaluaons
Service Evaluaons
Economic Evaluaons
Effect on Instuonal Trust of 1 S.D. Shi in Explanatory Variable
Panel B. 2010
0.15
0.43
0.41
0.39
-0.37
-0.23
0.23
1.67
0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
Age
Rural
SES
Right Ideology
Independent
Opposion
Civic Engagement
Combat Corrupon
Effect on Instuonal Trust of 1 S.D. Shi in Explanatory Variable
Panel C. 2012
Figure 2. Magnitude of significant effects on institutional trust, Haiti.
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with our theoretical expectations. To assess substantive effects of the independent variables, we 
calculated the influence of one standard deviation change in each significant variable on institu-
tional trust. These estimates help us identify the variables with the largest substantive influence on 
trust within each country-year.19 We show the results of these calculations for the Dominican 
Republic in Figure 1 and for Haiti in Figure 2.
While economic evaluations have significant positive effects on institutional trust in each sur-
vey except Haiti 2012, the figures clearly indicate that the effects of economic assessments are 
often substantively smaller than evaluations of political performance. In Haiti, performance in all 
three non-economic arenas overshadows economic evaluations in the magnitude of their impact on 
trust in 2008 and 2010, while in 2012 assessments of anti-corruption efforts are the only perfor-
mance measure with a statistically significant effect. In the Dominican Republic, evaluations of 
government efforts to combat crime and corruption have effects that far exceed those exerted by 
economic evaluations. In both countries, assessments of government efforts to uphold the rule of 
law by fighting corruption and crime stand out as consistently powerful factors shaping institu-
tional trust. One of these two variables has the largest substantive effect in every survey, and in 
several country-years they rank first and second in effect size. The influence exerted by security 
and corruption evaluations is substantively important and suggests that government efforts to pro-
tect public safety and combat corruption are particularly powerful explanations of trust in places 
where rule of law cannot be taken for granted. These findings coincide with previous studies on 
developing countries and less-developed democracies, which have also found evaluations of gov-
ernment performance in these areas to be particularly important in shaping trust (Askvik et al., 
2011; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Morris and Klesner, 2010; Seligson, 2002; Wong et al., 2011).
The analysis also considers how different types of participation might shape institutional trust. 
We hypothesized that the politicized and clientelist nature of associational life in the Dominican 
Republic would make it less likely for civic engagement there to promote formation of trust-
enhancing social capital and, in fact, we observe no significant effects for community participation 
on trust in the Dominican Republic. In Haiti where associational life tends to be more organic, we 
find a strong positive relationship between civic engagement and institutional trust in 2008 and 
2012. While we find no similar effect in 2010, this anomaly may be a result of unusual circum-
stances following the devastating earthquake. Regarding religious engagement, we observe a sig-
nificant positive relationship between participation in religious meetings and trust among 
Dominicans in 2008 and 2010 and no significant effect in Haiti; these results align with our 
expectations.
As previous research has found and we hypothesized, attention to politics is associated with 
more institutional trust in the Dominican Republic across all three surveys. Moreover, political 
interest has the largest substantive effect of all the engagement measures among Dominicans 
(Figure 1). The findings for political interest in Haiti are contradictory. Whereas we observe a 
negative relationship between interest and trust in 2008, the sign of the coefficient reverses in 
2010, becoming positive and significant, and in 2012 there is no significant effect. The volatility of 
this variable’s effect in Haiti is surprising and the nature of our analysis only permits us to specu-
late about the reasons. Perhaps the change from 2008 to 2010 can be attributed to politically inter-
ested people recognizing in 2010 that government was not to blame for the earthquake and hoping 
that the state might be strengthened through the reconstruction effort. This hope might have trans-
lated temporarily into more institutional trust among the politically interested. If this is the causal 
mechanism, then this positive relationship between interest and trust would be fleeting, potentially 
reverting to a negative effect over time. The insignificant result in 2012 might be part of this rever-
sion. However, this is a hypothesis that cannot be tested with our data here; only further analysis in 
future research could fully explain this pattern.
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In addition to these measures of positive participation, we also examine the effects of particular-
istic and partisan participation. As expected, we did not find that particularistic participation, meas-
ured as individuals seeking personal benefits from the state, promoted institutional trust. Indeed, in 
five of the six surveys particularistic participation has a negative coefficient, although its effect in 
undermining trust is only significant for the Dominican Republic in 2010. Moreover, the significant, 
negative coefficient in the 2010 Dominican survey provides limited evidence that this sort of partici-
pation has the potential to undermine social capital and institutional trust, although these results are 
merely suggestive.20 We also find some support for the idea that engagement through partisan ave-
nues will foster greater trust among supporters of the incumbent than among independents and 
opposition partisans. Negative and significant coefficients on several of the measures of political 
opposition and independence in both countries lend credence to this argument.
In terms of ideology, right-leaning respondents in both countries are more trusting of govern-
ment than those on the left. Our findings also lend some support to the view that democratic values 
are positively associated with trust, as we see small but significant positive coefficients for demo-
cratic attitudes in all three Dominican surveys and in 2008 in Haiti.
Conclusions
The analysis here assesses theories of institutional trust in Haiti and the Dominican Republic – two 
developing countries that have shared some historical legacies but currently manifest divergent 
economic and political trajectories. The evidence confirms that conventional theories emphasizing 
participation and government performance help us understand institutional trust in both countries. 
Our analysis also points to the importance of incorporating multiple facets of these theoretical 
arguments when analyzing trust in the developing world and suggests new hypotheses concerning 
how context might shape the precise ways in which performance and engagement influence insti-
tutional trust.
Evaluations of government performance are particularly powerful explanations of institutional 
trust in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, a finding consistent with much previous research. To 
gain a more nuanced and thorough understanding of how performance influences trust, we consid-
ered facets of performance beyond conventional economic measures. Drawing on previous studies 
analyzing trust in the developing world, we hypothesized that government performance in policy 
areas related to state capacity and the rule of law may have especially strong effects in contexts like 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic where the state has historically been weak and threats to the rule 
of law are pervasive. Our findings support this argument. In both countries, the impact of economic 
evaluations on trust is significant, but substantively smaller than the influence of variables measur-
ing other aspects of government performance. Evaluations of anti-corruption and anti-crime efforts 
are particularly influential. These findings, together with similar evidence from previous research in 
less-established democracies (e.g. Askvik et al., 2011; Mishler and Rose, 2005; Wong et al., 2011), 
highlight the importance of considering how government performance outside the economic arena 
shapes institutional trust, especially in fragile democracies and weak states. If governments are to 
promote trust in regime institutions within these contexts, it is imperative that they foster confidence 
in the state itself by combating corruption, providing security and delivering basic services.
We also theorized that engagement has distinct dimensions likely to influence institutional trust 
in different and context-contingent ways. Scholars frequently debate whether engagement has a 
positive or negative effect on social capital and institutional trust. Our evidence here suggests that 
debating the general effect of engagement itself is not the most productive path; rather, what really 
matters are the kinds of ties being formed and the contexts in which participation occurs. In line 
with previous research pointing to the significance of partisan ties in shaping institutional trust 
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(e.g. Anderson et al., 2005), the analysis offers some support for the hypothesis that partisan par-
ticipation increases institutional trust among supporters of the incumbent but not among govern-
ment opponents and independents. We also find that particularistic forms of participation fail to 
promote institutional trust in both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and there is some evidence 
that seeking personal benefits from government has the potential to undermine confidence in gov-
ernment institutions.
Meanwhile, our findings concerning the influence of positive forms of participation through 
civic and religious engagement and political interest point to the possibility that context may shape 
how these types of engagement influence institutional trust. For instance, the evidence supports our 
contention that the partisan and clientelist patterns that often characterize Dominican associational 
life limit the extent to which civic participation fosters institutional trust there. Meanwhile in Haiti, 
grassroots organizations are more central to associational life and, in this context, we hypothesized 
that civic engagement would have greater potential to promote trust in state institutions. We observe 
such a positive relationship in the 2008 and 2012 Haiti surveys. In addition, differences in church–
state relations in the two countries led us to expect that religious engagement might be more sup-
portive of institutional trust in the Dominican Republic than in Haiti, a pattern borne out in the 
empirical analysis. Of course, the analysis here concerning how context shapes the influence of 
participation rests on comparisons between two countries, making the findings more suggestive than 
conclusive. However, the disparate patterns in the connections between engagement and trust, which 
we anticipated based on contextual differences between Haiti and the Dominican Republic and that 
we observe in the empirical analysis, offer useful hypotheses regarding the causal mechanisms link-
ing engagement and trust. To explore the broader applicability of these contextualized hypotheses 
concerning civic engagement, future research should assess them in a wider range of cases.
Our findings here suggest that distinct dimensions of performance and engagement may have 
differing levels of importance and even divergent effects depending upon relevant features of the 
institutional, social and political context. Thus, efforts to contextualize analyses of institutional 
trust have the potential to illuminate the causal mechanisms through which performance and par-
ticipation shape trust in state institutions. Future research might delve more deeply into this aspect 
of attitude formation, assessing how contextual features condition the effects of performance and 
engagement on institutional trust.
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Notes
 1. Mishler and Rose (2005) call these approaches institutional and cultural theories, respectively.
 2. Linguistic differences and limited communication among the academic communities of both countries 
has contributed to this pattern. Instead, analysts frequently compare the Dominican Republic to other 
Hispanic Latin American countries, whereas Haiti, with its cultural and linguistic differences, is often 
absent from these discussions. Moreover, the divergent trajectories of the two countries since the 1960s 
may have also led to fewer comparative analyses.
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 3. Heine and Thompson (2011: 1) argue this was ‘the most devastating natural disaster to occur in the 
Americas’ with 230,000 lives lost, 300,000 injured and 1.5 million displaced.
 4. In the Dominican Republic, the three AmericasBarometer surveys analyzed below were conducted 4–26 
March 2008, 20 January–9 February 2010 and 1 January–15 February 2012.
 5. In Haiti, the three AmericasBarometer surveys analyzed below were conducted 1 January–9 February 
2008, 13 July–11 August 2010 (6 months after the earthquake and 4 months before November elections) 
and 20 January–6 February 2012.
 6. The additive scale includes trust in the national legislature, Supreme Court, national election commission 
and the courts. Higher values indicate more trust. For details on question wordings and scales, see the 
Supplemental Appendix.
 7. The regional average was 10.8 in 2008, 11.8 in 2010 and 11.6 in 2012.
 8. If associations maintain linkages outside the local context, they tend to be with private (often interna-
tional) non-governmental organizations (NGOs), rather than with the state or parties (Bell, 2010; Pierre-
Louis, 2011).
 9. On the measure of civic engagement in the analysis below, Haiti and the Dominican Republic consist-
ently place among the five countries with the most participation.
10. The surveys have about 1500 respondents, except Haiti in 2010 when 1752 people were interviewed in 
order to oversample internally displaced persons after the January earthquake. In our analyses, appropri-
ate sampling weights are used to obtain nationally representative results.
11. For details on question wordings and scales for all variables, see the Supplementary Data Appendix. This 
appendix also contains the mean and standard deviation for each variable and Cronbach’s alphas for all 
scales.
12. Cronbach’s alpha is a scale reliability coefficient computed based on the inter-item correlations of scale 
components, which helps determine if creating an additive scale is appropriate. Scores over 0.6 are 
strong; those over 0.8 are excellent.
13. In other analysis not shown, we employed an additive scale based on participation in community organi-
zations, neighborhood improvement projects, school-based parent associations and professional, trade 
or peasant associations. The results using this scale parallel those reported here. We use the single item 
rather than the scale because Cronbach’s alpha scores at or below 0.5 indicated limited scale reliability.
14. Ideally we could measure actual attention to political information, but such questions were only asked in 
2008.
15. To construct the factor score we employ polychoric factor analysis appropriate for ordinal indicators. The 
three survey items load onto a single factor in all six country-years, with Eigenvalues ranging from 1.3 
(Haiti, 2010) to 2.2 (Dominican Republic, 2010) and factor loadings generally over 0.7. To validate this 
measure’s ability to tap the concept of particularistic participation, we compared it to a question asking 
if a candidate or party had offered respondents some material benefit in exchange for their vote. Because 
this measure of vote-buying was never asked in the Haitian surveys and was only sporadically available 
in the Dominican data, we cannot employ it here, but it does allow us to demonstrate the validity of our 
factor score measure. See the supplemental material for details.
16. In the Dominican Republic, those affiliated with the PLD are coded Incumbent (45.6% in 2008, 35.4% 
in 2010, 31.9% in 2012), while supporters of other parties are coded as Opposition (21.5% in 2008, 
17.5% in 2010, 29.6% in 2012). In Haiti, supporters of President Rene Préval’s Fwon Lespwa are 
coded Incumbent in 2008 and 2010 (20.6% and 3.1%, respectively), and supporters of other parties are 
treated as Opposition (6.2% in 2008, 22.7% in 2010). In 2012, Michel Martelly of Repons Peyizan was 
president. His co-partisans are coded Incumbent (20.7%), and supporters of other parties are coded as 
Opposition (8.3%). In both countries, those with no affiliation are Independents, a larger group in Haiti 
than in the Dominican Republic.
17. To avoid the potential pitfalls associated with missing data, a common issue in survey research, we used 
the ICE (Imputation by Chained Equations) package for STATA to impute missing values on our inde-
pendent variables. See the supplemental material for details.
18. All analyses were conducted using STATA 12.0.
19. The goal here is not to compare the size of effect across different surveys, but rather to identify the most 
powerful predictors of institutional trust within each survey.
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20. These inconclusive effects may be partly due to our measure, which is necessarily indirect. Unfortunately, 
questions focused explicitly on clientelism were not available in most of the country-years analyzed 
here. In the Dominican 2010 data, when such a question was available, we observe a significant negative 
relationship between clientelism and institutional trust, which reinforces our findings reported in the text 
(see Supplemental Appendix for more details).
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